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Two Kinds of Ends in Themselves in Kant’s Moral Theory 
 
 
Abstract 
Immanuel Kant argues that rational beings are bound by an unconditional moral requirement to 
treat humanity always as an end and never as mere means. Kant derives this requirement from 
the principle that humanity is an end in itself. The purpose of my essay is to provide an 
interpretation of Kant’s concept of an end in itself that is consistent with the other features of his 
moral theory and that does not have morally repugnant consequences.  
To be consistent, Kant must identify a good will with an end in itself. I provide two independent 
arguments to demonstrate that this follows from the type of value Kant uniquely attributes to a 
good will and an end in itself. I also rely on Kant’s teleological claims about the faculty of 
reason to explain how a good will can be an end in itself.  
To be morally acceptable, a good will cannot be the only end in itself. If Kant identifies only a 
good will with an end in itself, then by “humanity” he refers only to beings that have a good will. 
This would mean that beings lacking a good will fall outside of the scope of the unconditional 
moral requirement. 
I argue that Kant avoids this consequence by invoking a distinction between two kinds of ends in 
themselves. This distinction is suggested by a parallel between his argument regarding freedom 
and his derivation of the unconditional moral requirement. By attending to this parallel and the 
way he uses the term “humanity” in various works, I argue that Kant takes all rational beings, 
even if they lack a good will, to be a kind of end in itself and to deserve the fullest sort of moral 
consideration. 
Keywords: Kant, good will, humanity, end 
 
 
I – Introduction 
 
This essay has two main goals. The first is to demonstrate that Kant identifies a good will 
with an end in itself. The second is to defend this interpretation (the good will interpretation) 
from the objection that it has morally repugnant consequences. I begin, in Section II, with a brief 
overview of Kant’s moral theory and the formula of humanity as an end in itself (henceforth, 
FHE). In Sections III and IV, I put forward two independent arguments based on Kant’s value 
claims to demonstrate that he identifies a good will with an end in itself. In Section V, I respond 
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to a potential objection concerning whether a good will could play the role of an end in itself in 
Kant’s moral theory. In Section VI, I set out the main objection to the good will interpretation, 
namely that it has the consequence of excluding some human beings from receiving the fullest 
sort of moral consideration. In Section VII, I draw a parallel between Kant’s argument regarding 
freedom and his derivation of the FHE to demonstrate that he makes a distinction between two 
kinds of ends in themselves. In Section VIII, I make use of this distinction to overcome the 
objection reviewed in Section VI. 
 
II – The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself 
 
According to Kant, moral principles must be objective, meaning they must apply to all 
rational beings without exception (G 4:389)1. To satisfy this criterion, moral principles must be 
based on reason alone. This is because reason abstracts from everything that does not hold for all 
rational beings, such as desires or inclinations and the features of human nature. Human beings 
do not necessarily determine their will, or act, according to moral principles because their will is 
subject to the influence of reason as well as inclinations that can be contrary to reason. Kant 
claims that because the human will is imperfect in this way, it is subject to a formula called a 
“categorical imperative” which presents moral principles to it as absolutely necessary, or 
unconditional, requirements (G 4:413-4). There is only one categorical imperative but Kant 
provides several versions of it to represent the different features that a moral principle must have. 
The second version, the FHE, represents the end that a moral principle must have (G 4:436).  
Kant defines an end as “that which serves the will as the objective ground of its self-
determination” (G 4:427). This is commonly understood to mean that an end is something for the 
sake of which a rational being acts or refrain from acting (Korsgaard 185; Wood Kant’s Ethical 
Thought 116). For example, in going to the gym, one’s end might be health; one acts for the sake 
of one’s health. In refraining from going out at night, one’s end might be self-preservation; one 
refrains from acting for the sake of one’s self-preservation2. Before Kant identifies the end of 
moral principles, he claims that it must be a specific type of end called an “end in itself” (G 
4:428). An end in itself is an objective end, meaning that it can be held by all rational beings 
because it is determined by reason alone. Kant ultimately identifies the end of moral principles, 
or the end in itself, to be humanity. Thus, in acting on moral principles, one must act or refrain 
from acting for the sake of whatever is referred to by “humanity”. The FHE represents this in the 
command to “act [so that] you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as means” (G 4:429). In the following 
two sections, I argue that Kant identifies the end in itself with a good will, and thus, takes 
“humanity” to refer to a good will. 
 
                                                          
1 Kant’s works are cited by abbreviation plus the Academy volume and page number. I use the following 
abbreviations: C2 = Critique of Practical Reason, C3 = Critique of Judgment, G = Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals, M = The Metaphysics of Morals, R = Religion within Boundaries of Mere Reason. 
2 I borrow this example from Korsgaard (185) 
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III – The Good Will and Kant’s Notions of “Good” and “Value” 
 
According to Kant, all rational beings have a faculty called a “will” which is determined, 
or moves a rational being to action, in accordance with principles (G 4:427). Kant defines a 
“good will” as a will that determines itself according to moral principles. He says that duty, i.e. 
acting morally, “is the condition of a will that is good” and that “[the principle of] an absolutely 
good will must be a categorical imperative” (G 4:403; G 4:444)3. Kant famously begins the first 
Section of the Groundwork with the claim that “it is impossible to think of anything at all in the 
world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good 
will.” (G 4:393). He claims that, unlike a good will, one’s happiness, character traits, abilities, 
and possessions are only good on the condition that one is worthy of them and does not put them 
to bad uses (G 4:393-4).   
 
Later in the Groundwork, Kant claims that the end in itself is “something whose existence 
in itself has an absolute worth” (G 4:428). Richard Dean, one of the few friends of the good will 
interpretation, has argued that because a good will is the only thing that is good without 
limitation and because an end in itself has absolute value, they must be identical (35-42). This is 
the conclusion I am attempting to establish in this essay, but as Henry Allison points out, it is not 
entailed by these two value claims alone: “an unargued premise in Dean’s account is the 
identification of being valuable with being good” (215) 4.  
 
Though Allison is correct, there is significant textual evidence for taking Kant to endorse 
this premise. Kant appears to treat “good” and “valuable” as identical predicates, claiming, on 
the one hand, that a good will is “good without limitation” and “good…absolutely” and, on the 
other hand, that it “has absolute worth”, “full worth in itself”, and “infinite [worth]” (G  4:394; 
C2 5:128). Kant also says that a stoic philosopher was mistaken to call pain evil, because “pain 
did not in the least diminish the worth of his person” (C2 5:60). This quote indicates that Kant 
takes there to be a connection between evil and negative worth. Given that Kant defines evil as 
“the opposite contradicting [the good]” (R 6:22), he must take there to be a connection between 
good and positive worth. In light of what has just been reviewed, a valid argument for the 
identity of a good will and an end in itself (one that vindicates Dean’s argument) can now be 
formulated: 
(P1) The only thing that is good without limitation is a good will 
                                                          
3 Some commentators take Kant to be referring to a perfect will rather than a good will by “absolutely good will” 
(Wood 15). A perfect will is one that necessarily acts on moral principles; it has no choice in the matter. I believe 
this reading is incorrect. Kant takes it to be impossible for a human being to instantiate a perfect will, but says that 
an “absolutely good will” is possible for human beings (G 4:437). Furthermore, when Kant introduces the term 
“absolutely good will” he strongly implies that he has returned to the topic of a merely good, rather than perfect, will 
(G 4:437). I take this to be good evidence for understanding Kant to use “absolutely good will” and good will 
interchangeably. 
 
4 In what follows, the terms “worth” and “value” will be used interchangeably. Oliver Sensen points out that in the 
original German texts, Kant has only one expression for these two terms: ‘Werth’ (‘Dignity and the Formula of 
Humanity’ 102). 
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(P2) The terms “good” and “worth” are used as identical predicates or a connection holds 
between something’s goodness and its worth 
(P3) It follows from (P2) that something is good without limitation if and only if it has 
absolute worth 
(P4) An end in itself has absolute worth 
(P5) It follows from (P3) and (P4) that an end in itself is good without limitation 
(C) It follows from (P1) and (P5) that a good will is an end in itself 
 
IV – The Good Will as the Condition of Worth 
 
If one remains sceptical of the connection between Kant’s notions of “good” and 
“worth”, or if, for the sake of argument, it is assumed that he uses the these notions to mean two 
entirely different things, it still follows from the “absolute worth” Kant attributes to an end in 
itself that he identifies it with a good will. The argument I make in this section to establish this 
conclusion runs as follows: 
(P1) Something must instantiate a good will in order to have moral worth 
(P2) An end in itself has a moral worth 
(C) It follows from (P1) and (P2) that an end in itself must instantiate a good will 
 
Kant does not claim that all kinds of worth depend on having some relation to a good 
will. For example, he takes certain things to have worth just in virtue of being desired or being 
useful for one’s purposes: “all objects of the inclination have only a conditional worth… [and 
things] have only a relative worth, as means” (G 4:428). Although conditional or relative worth 
can be independent of a good will, Kant identifies a different type of worth which always 
presupposes, or depends for its existence, on a good will. This is expressed by Kant’s claims that 
“nothing can have a worth other than that which is [determined by moral principles]”, “all 
worthiness depends on moral conduct”, “certainty of a disposition in accord with [moral 
principles] is the first condition of any worth”, and “the concept of a will that is…good apart 
from any further purpose…constitutes the condition of all [worth]” (G 4:436; C2 5:130; C2: 
5:73; G 4:397). Kant does not qualify “worth” in these quotes with expressions like 
“conditional” or “relative”, indicating that he is talking about a distinct and moral kind of worth. 
These quotes also explicitly make the point that, in contrast to the former kind of worth, the latter 
kind depends on a good will. I contend that what Kant is expressing in these quotes is that 
something must instantiate a good will in order to have moral worth. This is indicated by his 
claim that an action must be done from duty (which is the condition of a good will) in order to 
have moral worth: “action first has its genuine moral worth” when it is done “simply from duty” 
(4:398-9). This is also indicated by Kant’s claim that an individual must instantiate a good will in 
order to have moral worth. Kant says that when one acts from duty “it is just then that the worth 
of character comes out, which is moral and incomparably the highest” and that “the only thing 
which can give man’s existence an absolute value…consists in what he does, how and on what 
principles he acts… in other words, I mean a good will” (G 4:438; C3 443).  
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In light of the preceding discussion, (P1), the premise that something must instantiate a 
good will in order to have moral worth, can be properly ascribed to Kant. (P2), the premise that 
an end in itself has moral worth, also follows from Kant’s claim that it has “absolute worth” 
which he directly contrasts with the kind of worth that is “conditional and therefore contingent” 
(G 4:428). From these two premises, the conclusion follows that an end in itself must instantiate 
a good will. This makes perfect sense on the ‘good will interpretation’ because if an end in itself 
is a good will, then of course it instantiates a good will. 
 
V – Potential Objection: Can the Good Will be an End in Itself? 
 
Having set out my arguments for interpreting Kant to identify a good will with an end in 
itself, I will now turn to the question of what this identity signifies. In accordance with the 
explanation of an end in itself in Section II, the identity must signify that a good will is 
something for the sake of which all rational beings act or refrain from acting. This is prima facie 
problematic, because there are presumably some rational human beings that do not have a 
concept of a good will.  It might seem that one must have a concept of a good will in order to 
know how to, and in order to be able to, act or refrain from acting for its sake. This point gives 
rise to a potential objection against the good will interpretation: 
(P1) A rational being needs a concept of a good will to act or refrain from acting for its 
sake 
(P2) Some rational beings lack this concept and therefore cannot act or refrain from 
acting for its sake 
(P3) Following from (P1) and (P2) and the definition of an objective end, a good will 
cannot be an objective end 
(P4) An end in itself must be an objective end 
(C) Following from (P3) and (P4) a good will cannot be an end in itself 
 Kant’s account of the ultimate purpose of reason constitutes an indirect response to this 
objection by refuting (P1). Kant makes a teleological assumption that nature has assigned all 
living things with instruments or faculties that are “most appropriate…and best adapted” to a 
certain end (G 4:395). He also claims that nature has assigned reason to us “as a practical 
faculty”; one that has influence over our actions (G 4:395). In accordance with Kant’s 
teleological assumption, reason could not have been given to us to influence our actions for the 
end of happiness. Kant claims that instinct, rather than reason, is the most appropriate faculty for 
this end and he notes that people are often made less happy when they guide their behaviour by 
reason (G 4:396). Kant considers only one other candidate for the end of reason and concludes 
that reason was assigned to us to influence our actions so that we become moral rather than 
happy (G 4: 396). This means that the end of reason, or what all rational actions aim at, is the 
achievement of a good will: “the true vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good” 
(G 4:396). Returning to the potential objection, a rational being does not need a concept of a 
good will in order to act or refrain from acting for its sake. According to Kant, when one acts 
from reason, this happens automatically, in accordance with the designs of nature. 
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VI – Main Objection: The Charge of Moral Repugnance 
 
As mentioned in Section II, Kant explicitly identifies an end in itself with humanity. He 
represents this in the FHE, the unconditional command to treat whatever is referred to by 
“humanity” always as an end and never as mere means. From the interpretation that has been set 
out thus far, it follows that Kant uses the term “humanity” to refer to a good will. This would 
mean that, on this interpretation, the FHE doesn’t command treating all human beings always as 
an end and never as mere means, but only the ones that instantiate a good will. Kant does not 
appear to believe that all human beings have a good will. He claims that “one could cite no safe 
examples of the disposition to act from pure duty” (G: 4:406) and suggests that at least some 
“human beings…are in a state of moral…depravity” (M 6: 469). Thus, at least some, and 
potentially all, human beings do not fall under the scope of the FHE. This morally repugnant 
consequence has been noted by Richard Dean: “if the good will reading is right, it looks as 
though we may not have [duties] towards many actual humans, since many humans lack a good 
will” (92). Henry Allison also articulates this concern: 
The similarities between Kant’s accounts of the concept of a good will and of an end in 
itself… is often viewed as a source of embarrassment, since it seems to commit Kant to 
the implausible view that we only have duties to those with a good will (214). 
 
VII – Two Kinds of Ends in Themselves 
 
For now, I will set aside the objection reviewed in the previous section. Before I can 
adequately respond to it in defense of the good will interpretation, I must demonstrate that Kant 
distinguishes between two kinds of ends in themselves. I contend that Kant recognizes both an 
‘actual’ end in itself and a ‘practical’ end in itself. Only a good will qualifies as an actual end in 
itself. It is the only thing that has absolute worth and all non-conditional, non-relative worth 
depends on it. It also constitutes the end of all rational actions in accordance with the ultimate 
purpose of the faculty of reason. By contrast, all rational beings, regardless of whether or not 
they use their reason to act on moral principles, qualify as practical ends in themselves. Practical 
ends in themselves do not necessarily have absolute worth, but, as rational beings, they are 
morally required to treat others and to be treated as if they did5. My argument for attributing this 
distinction to Kant hinges on the similarities between his argument regarding freedom and his 
derivation of the FHE. I will review each in turn. 
Kant acknowledges that he “cannot prove…freedom as something actual” (G 4:448). 
Nevertheless, he claims that he can attribute a kind of freedom to all rational beings by proving 
                                                          
5 Some commentators understand Kant’s claims regarding the “dignity” of all rational beings to mean that they all 
have absolute worth, even if they do not instantiate a good will (Wood Kant’s Ethical Thought 135). In his paper, 
“Kant’s Conception of Human Dignity”, Oliver Sensen provides compelling reasons to reject this understanding. He 
claims that Kant employs a Stoic conception of dignity which concerns something’s prerogative over something 
else. Sensen catalogues all 111 uses of the term “dignity” in Kant’s published writings to argue that Kant did not 
conceive of dignity as a non-relational value property. 
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that they all necessarily act under the idea of freedom. He states, “every being that cannot act 
otherwise than under the idea of freedom is precisely for this reason actually free in a practical 
respect” (G 4:448). For Kant, a being acts under the idea of freedom if it represents itself as free, 
regardless of whether or not it really is free. So, to establish that all rational beings are free in a 
practical respect, Kant must establish that all rational beings necessarily represent themselves as 
free. He does this in two steps. In the first step, he claims that an individual rational being must 
represent itself as free. This is because it necessarily attributes the cause of its judgments to its 
reason, rather than to alien influences. Kant explains that a rational being “cannot possibly think 
[that its] reason… would receive steering from elsewhere in regard to its judgments” and because 
of this, it must “be regarded by itself as free” (G 4:448). In the second step, Kant establishes that 
a rational being must represent every other rational being as free. Because a rational being 
represents itself as free in virtue of its reason, “from precisely the same ground [it has] to 
attribute to every being endowed with reason…this quality, to determine itself to action under 
the idea of its own freedom” (G 4:449). Demonstrating that all rational beings necessarily 
represent themselves as free, i.e. that they necessarily act under the idea of their own freedom, 
leads Kant to conclude that they are all practically free. “The will of a rational being can be a 
will of its own only under the idea of freedom and must therefore with a practical aim be 
attributed to all rational beings” (G 4:448). 
In order to derive the FHE, Kant employs exactly the same strategy that he uses in his 
argument regarding freedom. He first considers how a rational being necessarily represents itself, 
and then argues that it is committed to representing all other rational beings in the same way: 
The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way [as an end 
in itself]; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But every other 
rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on just the 
same rational ground that also holds for me; thus it is at the same time an 
objective principle, from which…it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. 
The practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use 
humanity…always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means (G 4:429) 
Kant’s argument regarding freedom established that all rational beings are practically rather than 
actually free in virtue of necessarily representing themselves as free. Given the parallel between 
this argument and the derivation of the FHE, the latter must only establish that all rational beings 
are practically, rather than actually, ends in themselves in virtue of necessarily representing 
themselves as ends in themselves. 
 
VIII – Overcoming the Objection 
  
 The previous section argued that Kant makes a distinction between an actual end in itself, 
identified with a good will, and a practical end in itself, identified with all rational beings. It must 
now be considered whether Kant’s use of the term “humanity” in the FHE refers to just one or 
both kinds of ends in themselves. At times, Kant does appear to use “humanity” to refer only to 
beings that have reason. For example, he claims that the predisposition to humanity “is rooted 
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in…reason” and he claims that the capacity to set an end by reason, possessed by all rational 
beings, “is what characterizes humanity” (R 6:28; M 6:392). However, Kant also uses 
“humanity” interchangeably with the term “personality”, which involves, not just the possession 
of reason, but the use of reason to act on moral principles (R: 627). Kant calls personality “the 
idea of humanity considered wholly intellectually” (R 6:28). Christine Korsgaard notes that “in 
[Kant’s] Critique of Pure Reason, humanity in one's own person and personality are spoken of as 
if they were the same thing" (190). Kant also refers to both “humanity as an end in itself” and 
“personality [as an] end in itself” (G 4:430; C2 587). Given that “humanity” for Kant, can refer 
to beings that possess a faculty reason and beings that use reason to act morally, thus 
instantiating a good will, “humanity” can refer to both practical and actual ends in themselves.  
If “humanity” in the FHE does, in fact, refer to both practical and actual ends in 
themselves, then the FHE does not exclude anyone that fails to instantiate a good will from the 
fullest sort of moral consideration. Considering the parallel between the derivation of the FHE 
and the argument for freedom once more indicates that this is what Kant intended. He claims that 
the moral principles that “would obligate a being that is actually free are still valid for a being 
that cannot act otherwise than as under the idea of its own freedom” (G 4:448). By analogy, the 
same moral principles that obligate a being that is an actual end in itself would be equally valid 
for a being that is a practical end in itself. 
A response to the objection reviewed in Section VI can now be put forward. If Kant took 
“humanity” to refer only to actual ends in themselves, then the beings that do not instantiate a 
good will, including at least some humans, would be denied proper moral treatment. However, 
Kant distinguishes between two kinds of ends in themselves and uses “humanity” in the FHE to 
refer to both kinds.  Thus, all beings that possess a faculty of reason, and not just the beings that 
instantiate a good will, fall under the scope of the command to treat others and to be treated 
morally. Thus, interpreting Kant to identify a good will with an end in itself does not have the 
morally repugnant consequence it has been charged with. 
 
IX – Conclusion 
 
The fact that a good will is the only thing with a certain value, in conjunction with the 
fact that an end in itself has that value, entails that a good will is an end in itself. Alternatively, 
the fact that something must instantiate a good will to have a certain value, in conjunction with 
the fact that an end in itself has that value, entails that an end in itself must instantiate a good 
will. Because nature has ensured that our faculty of reason influences us to act morally, a good 
will can be something for the sake of which all rational beings act or refrain from acting, thus 
serving the role of an end in itself. The purpose of this essay has not been to provide a 
philosophical defense of any of these claims but to defend an interpretation of Kant that 
attributes these claims to him. Much of the secondary literature on Kant strays from his texts or 
glosses over these claims to provide an interpretation of his views regarding a good will, an end 
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in itself, and the FHE6. The commentators that attempt to provide a consistent and natural 
reading of his texts provide an interpretation of his views regarding a good will, an end in itself, 
and the FHE which has a morally repugnant consequence7. I have attempted to show, by 
examining the parallel between Kant’s argument regarding freedom and his derivation of the 
FHE, and by considering how he uses the term “humanity”, that a consistent and natural reading 
of Kant need not have this consequence. Kant holds that only a good will and the beings that 
instantiate it are actual ends in themselves. Kant also holds that all rational beings are practical 
ends in themselves just in virtue of necessarily representing themselves to be ends in themselves. 
By recognizing that Kant uses “humanity” in the FHE to refer to both kinds of ends in 
themselves, one can, at the same time, accept the good will interpretation and the fact that, for 
Kant, all rational beings deserve full moral consideration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 The most prominent interpretations ascribe a view to Kant that is inconsistent with his claims about the good will. 
Korsgaard, Wood, and Allison identify all rational beings that have the mere capacity to set ends or to act on moral 
principles (even if they do not instantiate a good will) to be ends in themselves (see Works Cited page below).  
 
7 I have in mind Richard Dean, who defends the good will interpretation and bites the bullet that the FHE denies full 
moral consideration to beings that do not instantiate a good will (91-107). 
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